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JUDICIAL ABROGATION OF GOVERNMENTAL AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: A NATIONAL TREND
WITH A PENNSYLVANIA PERSPECTIVE

I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 23, 1973, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court filed an
opinion, Ayala v. PhiladelphiaBoard of Public Education,' which
abolished the doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability in Pennsylvania. On the same day another opinion, Brown v.

Commonwealth,2 upheld the concept of sovereign immunity.

With these two decisions the court not only demonstrated the
existence of a distinction between governmental and sovereign
immunity but also emphasized the trend in the United States
towards enlarging the scope of governmental tort responsibility,
particularly via judicial abrogation of the immunity doctrines.
Accordingly, the purpose of this Comment is two-fold. The first
is to outline the national movement towards greater governmental tort liability and to assess the Pennsylvania position with respect to it. The second, and larger, objective is to ultimately determine whether the stance adopted by the court in Brown will endure
future assaults upon the concept of sovereign immunity in the
commonwealth. In so doing, the doctrine of governmental and
sovereign immunity will be examined from both a national and a
Pennsylvania perspective. Furthermore, the obstacles encountered
by courts considering the abrogation of the immunity doctrines,
as well as the tactics employed to circumvent these difficulties,
will be similarly approached.
Governmental immunity from tort liability is that protection
afforded local governmental units-not the state-from responsibility for tortious conduct. 3 Apparently originating in 1788 with
the English case of Russell v. The Men of Devon,' the doctrine is
said to lie on six grounds: 5 1) the fear of an infinity of actions;
2) the lack of corporate funds out of which to satisfy tort judgments; 3) the failure of local units to derive profit from the exercise of governmental functions which are solely for the public
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 868 (1973).
See W. PaossE, LAW OF TORTS 977-84 (4th ed. 1971).
100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 3, at 978.

benefit; 4) the inapplicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior
to officers performing such functions, as the officers are agents of
the state and not of the local units; 5) the inability of local units
to effectively administer local government should tax money be
diverted to compensate tort damages; 6) the unreasonableness of
holding local units liable in the performance of duties imposed
upon them by the state legislature, rather than assumed voluntarily under their general power.
On the other hand, the doctrine of sovereign immunity enables
the state to avoid liability for the tortious exercise of its activities.6
Of even more ancient origin than its governmental counterpart"the King can do no wrong"-sovereign immunity is said to rest
on five grounds:7 1) the absurdity of a wrong committed by an
entire people; 2) the idea that whatever the state does must be
lawful; 3) the theory that an agent of the state is outside the scope
of his authority when he commits a wrongful act; 4) the reluctance to divert public funds to compensate for private injuries;
and 5) the inconvenience and embarrassment which would descend
upon the state if it should be subject to such liabilities. Moreover,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity has received substantial support from state constitutional provisions, which provide that the
state may be sued in such manner, and in such courts as the legislature may by law direct.8 In some instances, these provisions have
been interpreted to mandate sovereign immunity.9
As the foregoing illustrates, the differences between governmental and sovereign immunity fall into three categories. The
first is the subject of each immunity-governmental shields local
units, sovereign the state. The second is the origin of each concept-governmental from the 1788 case of Russell v. The Men of
Devon,'0 sovereign from the more ancient theory that "the King can
do no wrong." Third is the presence of subsequent constitutional
support; typically only sovereign immunity is deemed mandated by
state constitutional provisions. In comparing the two immunity
doctrines it is apparent that sovereign immunity has greater vitality. This will become even more evident in the following examination of the tendency towards imposing greater tort responsibility
on governmental units, local and state alike.
II. TEN

TowARDs GREATER GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

Although the doctrines of governmental and sovereign immunity have had apparently great vitality and wide-spread influence in the law, they are not above partial or total abrogation
6. See id. at 975-77.
7. Id. at 975.
8. See notes 167-205 and accompanying text infra.

9. Id.

10.

100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
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to meet changed conditions of society. 1
And certainly one of the changes taking place today not
only in the United States but also in many of the other
countries of the world, is a transition from individualism
to collective security-and this includes an assumption by
the body politic of much of the devastation created by all
manner of individual tragedies which due to accident, or
disease, to an act of God, or of the State, or of man. And
part and parcel of this trend is the gradual expansion of
tort liability of the State.
.. . The expansion will not be so rapid. Fear of an
"infinity of actions" in milking the public treasury gives
pause to legislatures as well as courts. But other nations
are doing
it without bankruptcy, and so will we, give us
12
time.
The foregoing observation, which has subsequently been proved
prophetic, was made in 1954, at a time when most states had not
undertaken tort liability. Indeed, a comprehensive national survey completed that year categorized the states into five groups in
an attempt to portray the extent to which state and local governments assumed liability in tort.13 This study indicated that abrogation of the immunity doctrines was accomplished in only one ju4
risdiction, New York---and that by way of legislative enactment,'
11. See generally B. CARnozo, ThE NAU OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
12-13, 19-21, 29-32, 40-42, 51-52, 54-56, 58, 62-66, 71-73, 75, 98-99, 112-17,
124-26, 129, 167-69 (1921).
12. Stason, Governmental Tort Liability Symposium, 29 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1319-20, 1324 (1954).
13. Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L.
R.v. 1362, 1407 (1954).
(1) Liability for Substantially All State Torts.
...

New York....

(2) Responsibility Undertaken in Most Cases.
Alabama, Arkansas (the state, but not local units), Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma (based upon questionable interpretation of new statute), Rhode Island (legislative discretion), Tennessee, and West Virginia.
(3)
Occasionally Responsible
California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan....
Montana, Oregon, South Carolina, North Dakota, Utah,
and Wisconsin.
(4) Responsibility Seldom Undertaken
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska,
New Hamoshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Washington.
(5)
Responsibility Almost Never Undertaken
Arizona, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Texas,
and Wyoming.
14. N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8 (1963):
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same
determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied

not judicial decision.' 5 However, the study concluded that governmental and sovereign immunities were on their way out as part of
the American legal system. 8 Yet the way out was described as
"slow and circuitous.' 7 The appealing advantage of immunity, the
dislike of paying off tort liabilities, and the anarchic self-identification of citizens with the state were viewed as tending to perpetuate the doctrines.' 8
Nevertheless, by 1966, fifteen other jurisdictions joined New
York by abrogating one or both of the immunity doctrines. 19 However, the more startling fact of this tally is that in ten of these
states, abrogation was accomplished by court decree. 20 Hence it
is not surprising to find the decade ending in 1966 characterized
as one in which a "major reshaping of governmental responsibility
in tort [had taken] place through an interplay of legislative and
judicial policy-making."' 2' The reason for the drastic change was
attributed to:
Strong, persuasive voices . . . [continuing] to advocate a
comprehensive eradication of the . . . immunity principle
through legislative action . . . [as well as] ... equally

strong and persuasive judges, wearying of the seemingly
endless wait for appropriate legislative action, [who] have
to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations....
15. Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, supra note 13,
at 1407.
16. Id. at 1414-15.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Jurisdictions abrogating governmental immunity: City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alas. 1962); Muscopf v. Corning Hosp.
Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr 89 (1961); Hargrove v.
Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Moliter v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 13 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Haney
v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Hamilton v. City of
Shreveport, 247 La. 784, 174 So. 2d 529 (1965); Williams v. City of Detroit,
364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Rice v. Clark County, 79 Nev. 253,
382 P.2d 605 (1963); Walsh v. Clark County School Dist., 82 Nev. 414,
419 P.2d 774 (1966); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115
N.W.2d 618 (1962).
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 662-1 to 662-15 (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 6330-1 to 63-30-34 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (Supp. 1972)
(as interpreted by Kelso v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wash. 2d 913, 390 P.2d 2
(1964) ).
Jurisdictions abrogating sovereign immunity: Stone v. Ariz. State

Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Muscopf v. Corning
Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Lipman v.
Brisbane Elem. School Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 230, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 47
(1961); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.50.250 (1973); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 662-1
to 662-15 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 25A.1 to 25A.20 (1967); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 41.031 to 41.039 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-1 to 63-30-34
(1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5601-5605 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.92.090 (Supp. 1972).
20. See cases cited note 19 supra.

21.

Van Alystyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change,

1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919, 976 (1966).
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seized the initiative and decreed reform by judicial fiat22in
jurisdictions embracing nearly one-fourth of the nation.
The next six years underscored the influence of the "strong
and persuasive" legislative and judicial voices, and the increasing
"weariness" of courts with legislative inaction. By 1972, thirteen
states 23 abolished the governmental immunity doctrine with the
courts taking the initiative on ten occasions. Nine states 24 adopted
a similar posture regarding sovereign immunity with five of these
being accomplished through the courts.
In 1973, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also grew "weary"
of legislative inactivity and became the most recent jurisdiction to
abrogate the doctrine of governmental immunity. 25 In Ayala v.
PhiladelphiaBoard of Public Education,28 governmental immunity
was interred in Pennsylvania. The court, apparently taking encouragement from its prior rejections of charitable 27 and intrafamily 28 immunities, refused to defer to legislative action. 29 Nevertheless it carefully limited its holding to governmental immunity. 0
Indeed, in an opinion filed the same day, the court upheld the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Although regretting it could not hold
22. Id.
23. Spencer v. Gen. Hosp., 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Veach v.
City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195, 427 P.2d 335 (1967); Parish v. Pitts, 244
Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968) (but governmental immunity restored by
statute, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901 (Supp. 1971) ); Evans v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 197, 482 P.2d 968 (1971); Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795,
473 P.2d 937 (1970); Campbell v. State,
Ind. , 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972);
Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962);
Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968); Johnson v.
Municipal University of Omaha, 184 Neb. 512, 169 N.W.2d 286 (1969); Willis
v. Dept. of Conservation, 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970); Becker v. Beaudoin, 261 A.2d 896 (R.I. 1970).
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 6,13A.1-613A.11 (Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 1751-1766 (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 30.260-.300 (1971).
24. Spencer v. Gen. Hosp., 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Evans v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 197, 482 P.2d 968 (1971); Smith v.
State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 968 (1971); Sims v. State, 94 Idaho 801,
498 P.2d 1274 (1972); Campbell v. State,
Ind.
, 284 N.E.2d 733
(1972); Willis v. Dept. of Conservation, 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8 (Smith-Hurd 1966); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 81-8,209 to 8,239 (1971); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 30.260-.300 (1971); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-31-1 to 31-7 (Supp. 1972).
25. In the same year, sovereign immunity was abrogated for all
state boards and agencies in Louisiana. Board of Comm'rs v. Splendour
Shipping and Enterprise Co.,
La.
, 273 So. 2d 19 (1973).
26. 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
27. Flagiello v. Pa. Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965).
28. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
29. Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 599-801, 305 A.2d
877,885 (1973).
30. Id. at 587 n.2, 305 A.2d at 877 n.2.

otherwise, the supreme court in Brown v. Commonwealth3 l felt
the doctrine to be constitutionally, not judicially, mandated and
susceptible only to legislative modification.32 Whether the court
will continue to adhere to this position may be open to doubt. As
the following discussion of governmental immunity will demonstrate, the similarities of the governmental concept to its sovereign
counterpart may be sufficiently close to facilitate the extension of
Ayala to sovereign immunity.

A.

III. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
Russell v. The Men of Devon

Although not in unanimous agreement, most state supreme
courts in the United States trace the origin of governmental immunity to 1788 and the English case of Russell v. The Men of Devon.33
However, as will be hereafter developed, the doctrine may have
merely become a settled principle of common law with Russell and
not establi shed by it. The dpfinitp Thv when the immunity doctrine arose is of crucial importance to courts contemplating its
partial or total abrogation, since courts usually do not hold themselves obligated to follow a common law rule arising subsequent
to the adoption of the Declaration of Independence.3 4 Hence, if
governmental immunity is ascribed to the Russell case, which was
decided in 1788, the courts are free to alter it. The Wyoming Supreme Court has refused to accept this genesis of the immunity doctrine.3 5 Its position is based on certain statements in Russell which
suggest the doctrine may have originated some two centuries prior.
The Russell decision involved an action on the case against the
inhabitants of the unincorporated county of Devon to recover damages done to the wagon of one Russell when it encountered a hole
in the Devon bridge. The men of Devon demurred generally to
charges that they breached their duty to maintain the bridge in a
passable condition. Lord Kenyon, Chief Justice, sustained the demurrer. Without discussing it, he referred to a case cited in
Brooke's Abridgement as precedent for a decision to disallow
suit.36 However, counsel for the men of Devon referred to the
case cited as standing for the following principle:
31. 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 868 (1973).
32. Id. at 570-71, 305 A.2d at 870.
33. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
34. E.g., Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla.
1957); Greenspan v. State, 12 N.J. 426, 431, 97 A.2d 390, 393 (1953); Loudon v. Loudon, 114 N.J. Eq. 242, 248, 168 A. 840, 844 (1933); Cawker v.
Dreutzer, 197 Wis. 98, 116, 221 N.W. 401, 414 (1928).
35. Maffei v. Inc. Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959).
36. Russell v. The Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (K. B. 1788):
Therefore, I think that this experiment ought not to be encouraged; there is no law or reason for supporting the action; and
there is a precedent against it in Brooke: though even without that
authority I should be of the opinion that this action cannot be

maintained.
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. [T]hat if an highway be out of repair, by which my
horse is mired, no action lies, "car est populus et surra reforme per presentment;" which must be understood to mean,
that as the road ought to be repaired by the public, no individual can maintain an 37
action against them for an injury
arising from their neglect.

After extensive research, the Wyoming Supreme Court has concluded this interpretation to be substantially correct.38 Hence the
case cited in Brooke lends significant support to the view that the
doctrine of governmental immunity is much older than the Russell
39
case.
Furthermore, Lord Kenyon recognized a lack of precedent to
sustain plaintiffs' position, and suggested an infinity of similar ac40
tions would be encouraged by a decision in plaintiffs' favor.
However, the chief justice placed considerable emphasis on the
fact that the suit was not authorized by statute. He noted that in
certain instances of negligence in law enforcement, suit could be
maintained against the hundred 41 because it was authorized by
law. 42 Consequently, he concluded that if the men of Devon were
to be held liable in the action, recourse must be made to the legis43
lature.
Apparently in agreement with much of the major opinion by
Lord Kenyon, the second opinion in Russell by Justice Ashurst
also cites the precedent in Brooke's Abridgement and concludes that
suit must be brought against the public, and not against the men
of Devon in their individual capacities. 44 Justice Ashurst also
stated an oft-quoted principle repugnant to modern minds that
"it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that
45
the public should suffer an inconvenience.
37. Id. at 360.
38. Maffei v. Inc. Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 43, 338 P.2d 808,
810-11 (1959).
39. The case cited in Brooke is of ancient origin. Brooke died in 1558.
See id. at 43, 338 P.2d at 811.
40. Russell v. The Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (K. B. 1788).
41. A unit of government under the Saxon organization of England
of which "its most remarkable feature was the corporate responsibility of
the whole for the crimes and defaults of the individual members." BLAC's
LAW DICTIONARY 874 (4th ed., rev., 1968).
42. Russell v. The Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (K. B. 1788).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 363.
45. Id. This principle has received comment in Annot., 75 A.L.R.
1196 (1931):
The whole doctrine of governmental immunity from liability in
tort rests upon rotten foundation. It is almost that in this modern
age of comparative sociological enlightenment, and in a republic,
. . .that the entire burden of damages resulting from the wrongful

In an opinion which apparently has had significant influence
on the courts of other states, 48 the California Supreme Court in
Muscopf v. Corning Hospital District,47 interpreted Russell as disallowing suit for two reasons. The court first emphasized that
the county was unincorporated and thus possessed no fund out of
which to satisfy a damage judgment. 4 Next, the court focused on
the statement of Ashurst that individual injury should be subordinated to the public convenience. 4 9 Indeed, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court not only subscribes to this interpretation of Russell,
but also adds an additional ground-permitting such suit would result in an infinity of actions. 50 However, in view of the emphasis
placed upon the absence of a statute authorizing suit, it is submitted the California and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts have misinterpreted Russell. Instead of focusing upon the main thrust of
Lord Kenyon's argument, the courts have stressed the secondary
reasons behind the decision. In fact, as the next section will illustrate, Russell was adopted by courts of this country for the proposition that no suit against local governmental units would be permitted without prior legislative consent. 51
B.

Mower v. Leicester

The First American decision sustaining governmental immunity was Mower v. The Inhabitants of Leicester 2 which involved
the killing of a horse when it stepped into a hole in the Leicester
bridge. Under law, the bridge was to be maintained by the inhabitants of Leicester. Citing Russell as precedent, the court denied
recovery, reasoning:
[QIuasi-corporations, created by the legislature for purposes of public policy, are subject, by the common law,
to an indictment for the negligence of duties enjoined on
them; but they are not liable to an action for such neglect,
unless the action be given by some statute ....
This
question is fully discussed in the case of Russell & Al. vs.
The Men of Devon, cited at the bar and the reasoning there
is conclusive against the action. 53
acts of the government should be imposed upon the single individual who suffers the injury, rather than distributed among the entire community constituting the government, where it could be
borne without hardship upon any individual and where it justly
belongs.
46. E.g., Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Rice v. Clark
County, 79 Nev. 253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963).
47. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
48. Id. at 215, 359 P.2d at 459, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
49. Id.
50. Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 588-89, 305 A.2d
877, 879 (1973).
51. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text infra.
52. 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
53. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

This was consistent with dicta expressed two years earlier by the
same court in Riddle v. The Proprietersof the Locks and Canals on
4
Merrimac River.5
The opinions in Mower and Riddle are significant. They not
only distinguish between the liability of public corporations and
the liability of private corporations, but also indicate the involuntary character of local governmental units-such units are forced
agents of the state. 5 Consequently, it is logical that the holding in
Mower and the dicta in Riddle emphasized Russell as standing for
the proposition that units of local government, in the absence of
statute, cannot be held liable in tort.56
As Mower and Riddle illustrate, early American judicial opinions involving governmental immunity stressed the public character of the functions performed by local governmental units.
Eventually, however, the local units undertook performance of
"proprietary" or business-like functions; when they did so, the
courts, for purposes of tort liability, placed them on the same footing as private corporations, and held them liable when such performance was tortious. 5 7 This distinction between "governmental"
54. 7 Mass. 169 (1810).
Although quasi-corporations are liable to information or indictment, for a neglect of public duty imposed by law; yet it is settled
in the case of Russell et al. v. Inhabitants of the County of Devon,
that no private action can be maintained against them for breach
of their corporate duty, unless such action be given by statute.
Id. at 186-87 (emphasis added).
55. As said by the court in Riddle: "We distinguish between private
aggregate corporations, and the inhabitants or any district who are by statute invested with particular powers without their consent." Riddle v. The
Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on the Merrimac River, 7 Mass. 169,
186 (1810) (emphasis added).
56. This conclusion is supported by a footnote to the Mower decision
wherein the editor of the volume states that Russell "seems to have been
decided merely on the ground that no action would lie against the inhabitants of the town unless given by statute." Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass.
247, 250 n.a (1812).
57. One of the early leading cases holding municipal corporations liable when performing a proprietary function is Bailey v. Mayor of New
York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
[W]hen the city performs a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects
revenue from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as
which there may be liability for the torts of municipal agents
within the scope of their employment. This is true where it supplies water, gas, or electricity, or where it operates a ferry, wharves
or docks, an airport, or a public market. City hospitals have
been held both governmental and proprietary. Where such a
thing as a municipal garage, a housing unit, or an arts and crafts
center is operated for profit, it nearly always has been held to be
proprietary; and the same is true of more doubtful institutions
such as hospitals.
W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, supra note 3, at 980-81 (footnotes omitted).

and "proprietary" functions became generally accepted in nearly
every jurisdiction in the United States.58 Consequently, local governmental units developed a two-fold character: the one, governmental, wherein they enjoy immunity; the other, proprietary, where
such status may subject them to liability. However, this classification has proved so unworkable as to prompt an exasperated New
Jersey court to state that the "rules which courts have sought to
establish in solving this problem are as logical as those governing
French irregular verbs."59s
C. Governmental Immunity as an Extension of Sovereign Immunity
When the state-local legal relationship is considered together
with the sovereign immunity of the state, governmental immunity
may be explained on grounds independent of Russell v. The Men of
Devon. 60
Local units, in absence of contitutionra! provisions to the contrary, derive their existence and their powers from express enactments of the state legislature.6 ' Although local units are, in a
sense, agencies of local self-government, they are also integral parts
of state government existing to administer state policies and programs. 62 Indeed, for the great majority of people, they constitute
the principal contact with government. No state now attempts,
or has ever attempted, to conduct all of its government from its
capital. Rather a state normally conducts most of its government
through its local units over which, in the absence of constitutional
provisions stipulating otherwise, it has absolute control.6
".
58. See W. PsossFR, LAW OF TonTs, supra note 3, at 979.
59. Weeks v. City of Newark, 62 N.J. Super. 166, 176, 162 A.2d 314,
321 (1960).
60. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788). See Fuller & Casner, Municipal
Tort Liability in Operations, 54 HARV. L. REv. 437 (1941). The view that
governmental immunity derived from sovereign immunity arose after judicial acceptance of governmental immunity. "[I]t was not until stare decisis
had done its work that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was introduced
as a rationalization of the result." Id. at 438.
See also note 55 and accompanying text supra wherein statements regarding the involuntary character of New England towns contained in
Riddle and Mower may lend support to the notion that governmental
immunity derives from sovereign immunity.
61. 1 C. ANTIEU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 1.01 (Cum.Supp.
1972); R.

COOLEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW

OF MTIwicIPAl

CORPORATIONS

6-7 (1914); 1 E. YOCKLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 11, 53 (1956).
62. R. COOLEY, supra note 61, at § 7.
63. [A]s said by Judge Cooley in an early work on Constitutional Limitations . . . , "in contradistinction to those governments

where powers are concentrated in one man, or in one or more
bodies of men, whose supervision and active control extends to
all objects of government within the territorial limits of the state,
the American system is one of complete decentralization, the
primary and vital idea of which is that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs only by central authorities.
1 E. YocKLrY, supra note 61, at § 4 (emphasis added).

§§
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[C]ounties, cities, etc. are political subdivisions of the state, and are
included in the term state, which is the concrete whole. Whatever
is done by such division under and by virtue of the permission and
.W4
mandate of the state only, is the act of the state quo ad hoc ...
This unitary view of government is significant for courts contemplating the abrogation of governmental immunity when sovereign immunity has already been abolished. When the legislature of the New York waived that state's immunity from liability,6 5 its Court of Appeals ruled that the legislature also waived immunity of local governmental units,"6 on the premise that the
political subdivisions had no independent sovereignty. 67 Similarly,
the Washington' Supreme Court, following the reasoning of the
New York court, ruled that when the Washington legislature waived
that state's immunity, 68 it also waived the immunity of the local
units. 69 The court reasoned that the common law right of sovereign immunity is not in the local units, but resides in the state
from which the immunity is derived. 70 The immunity of local units,
7
like their sovereignty, the court concluded, is in a sense borrowed. '
It is submitted that this view of governmental immunity as an
extension of sovereign immunity describes the true relationship of
Russell v. The Men of Devon7 ' to the latter doctrine. Two reasons
tend to support this conclusion. First, Russell may merely stand
for the proposition that suit against governmental units may not be
maintained without legislative consent. 73 Second, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity protected the sovereign from tort liability unless he consented to suit.74 Consequently, holding governmental
units to be an extension of the sovereign doctrine may be nothing
more than a reiteration of Russell.
D.

Governmental Immunity in Pennsylvania

The origins of governmental immunity in Pennsylvania are
somewhat obscure. Russell v. The Men of Devon7 5 was recog64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

State v. Levy Court, 17 Del. 597, 603, 43 A. 522, 524 (1899).
See note 14 supra.
Bernadine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
Id. at 365, 62 N.E.2d at 605.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (Supp. 1972).
Kelso v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wash. 2d 913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964).
Id. at 916, 390 P.2d at 5.
Id.
100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
See notes 40-56 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 102-117 and accompanying text infra.
100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).

nized in the commonwealth in Dean v. New Miford Township.7 6
There, the court interpreted Russell as standing on two grounds:
... 1. that [the] county was not a corporation, and 2. that
there was no county fund out of which satisfaction could
be made, and consequently if damages were recovered
against the county, it would have to be levied on one or two
individuals, who would have no means of reimbursing themselves. The inference is by no means unreasonable that
had not these reasons existed, the judgment would have
77
been different.
Since the defendant township was incorporated and possessed a
fund out of which to pay damages, the court accordingly held it
liable.
The case generally cited as establishing the rule of govern7
mental immunity in Pennsylvania is Fox v. Northern Liberties.
In that case, plaintiff was denied relief for the wrongful seizure of
his horse by the superintendent of police. However, the basis for
the decision was not on the ground of governmental immunity, but
on the ground that the act of the superintendent was so outside the
scope of his authority that not even a private employer would be
responsible for the act of an employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior.79 Thus, it is doubtful that Fox established a
general rule of governmental immunity in the Commonwealth.
Rather it would apparently be a more accurate conclusion that the
rule evolved in a piecemeal, case-by-case, fashion. 0 Hence, it is
not surprising to find many seemingly inconsistent and illogical
exceptions to the doctrine.
Liability existed where the act the local unit was mandated
76. 5 W. & S. 545 (Pa. 1843).
77. Id. at 547.
78. 3 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841). See also Boorse v. Springfield Twp.,
377 Pa. 109, 110, 103 A.2d 708, 709 (1954); Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 497, 499, 162 A.2d 378, 379 (1960).
79. Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103, 106 (Pa. 1841).
80. This is illustrated by cases arising during the period from 1860
to 1890. Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324 (1860) (liability not imposed on tortious performance of discretionary function for fear of assuming improper control over municipal affairs); Alcorn v. City of Phila.,
44 Pa. 348 (1863) (doctrine of respondeat superior held not to apply to
appointed officers of municipal corporations); Elliot v. City of Phila., 73
Pa. 347 (1874) (intentional torts of city employees outside scope of authority; respondeat superior does not apply); School Dist. v. Fulss, 98 Pa. 600
(1881) (negligence of independent contractor not imputed to school district; public school system analogized to public charity); County of Lehigh
v. Hoffort, 116 Pa. 119, 9 A. 177 (1887) (failure to exercise discretionary
powers not a basis of liability); Ford v. Kendall Borough School Dist.,
121 Pa. 543, 15 A. 812 (1888) (not only does a less stringent rule of respondeat superior apply to public corporations than to private corporations,
but an even less stringent rule applies to school districts; public school
system again analogized to public charity); Kies v. City of Erie, 135 Pa. 144,
19 A. 942 (1890) (broad statement respondeat superior does not apply to
acts of municipal employees).
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by statute,81 but not where the function was merely authorized by
legislation. 2 Liability attached where the function was determined
"proprietary," but not where it was deemed "governmental." 83 At
times, mismanagement of public property gave rise to liability,8 4
while in other instances it did not. 5 Consequently, the rule of
governmental immunity, a product of piecemeal evolution, became
the subject of piecemeal judicial erosion. Perhaps the reason the
doctrine was not completely abrogated earlier in Pennsylvania may
be found in the following words of Chief Justice Jones:
Even though the reasons for originating governmental immunity are now anachronistic, the Commonwealth may
wish to retain the rule for other, more modern reasons.
Only the legislature can deal with the field of immunity
in all of its state, municipal corporation and school district aspects by enacting a comprehensive bill based on extensive hearings and investigations. On the other hand
we continue to be confronted with the problem on a most
fragmented basis.88
Notwithstanding this acknowledgement of its inability to adequately solve the problem inherent in its traditional case-by-case
approach, the supreme court, seven years later in Ayala v. The
PhiladelphiaBoard of Public Education,8 7 took it upon itself to abolish the doctrine of governmental immunity. In response to a "letthe-legislature-do-it" argument, the court emphasized the reasoning
81. E.g., McCormick v. Allegheny County, 263 Pa. 146, 106 A. 203
(1919) (failure to maintain sidewalk); Rapho v. Moore, 68 Pa. 404 (1874)
(failure to maintain bridges); Dean v. New Milford Twp., 3 W. & S. 103
(Pa. 1841) (failure to maintain roads).
82. E.g., Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324 (1860) (construction of
drainage system).
83. E.g., Shields v. Pittsburgh School Dist., 408 Pa. 388, 184 A.2d 240
(1962); Morris v. Mt. Lebanon School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 144 A.2d 737 (1958);
Hill v. Allentown Housing Auth., 373 Pa. 92, 95 A.2d 879 (1953).
This distinction provoked an observation by the late Chief Justice
Cohen in Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 502-03, 162 A.2d 378, 381 (1960)
(concurring opinion):
The attempt to determine whether liability exists when a state or
municipal activity is conducted negligently by the test of whether
it is a governmental or proprietary function has resulted in complete confusion ...
We have treated torts by public employees on an ad hoc
basis. No course has been chartered to guide the courts in determining when and to what effect liability should be imposed. Our
prior .*,sionscan neither be distinguished nor justified.
84. E.g., Briegel v. City of Phila., 135 Pa. 451, 19 A. 1038 (1890)
(defective privy adjoining school house).
85. E.g., Kies v. City of Erie, 135 Pa. 144, 19 A. 942 (1890) (fire door
suddenly thrown across a public sidewalk).
86. Dillon v. York School Dist., 422 Pa. 103, 106, 220 A.2d 896, 898
(1966).
87. 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).

it utilized in its prior abrogation of charitable s and intra-family8 9
immunities: "We closed our courtroom doors without legislative
help and we can likewise open them."9' 0
The court9 1 followed the lead of the majority of courts in this
country by tracing the origin of governmental immunity to Russell
v. The Men of Devon9 2 and its subsequent adoption in the United
States by Mower v. Leicester."
Russell is interpreted by the
court to deny liability for three reasons: 1) fear of an infinity of
actions; 2) lack of adequate funds to satisfy a damage judgment;
and 3) subordination of the individual claim to the public conven94
ience.
However, it is submitted the court may have misinterpreted
the actual basis of the Russell decision. As discussed,9 5 Russell
may merely stand for the proposition that a governmental unit
may not be liable in tort without prior statutory authorization.
Had the Ayala court interpreted Russell on this basis, the similarities between governmental and sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania would become more evident. Indeed, in an opinion filed the
same day with Ayala, the court, in Brown v. Commonwealth,9 upheld the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Although basing its reasoning on a state constitutional provision, the court reached the
97
same conclusion as Russell-no suit without legislative consent.
Consequently, should the constitutional arguments favoring sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania be overcome, this similarity between the immunity doctrines may enable the abrogative reasoning
in Ayala to more easily extend to the sovereign immunity issue.
It should also be noted that, although Ayala is couched

in

88. Flagiello v. Pa. Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965).
89. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 382 A.2d 351 (1971).
90. Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 600, 305 A.2d 877,
885 (1973), referring to 'Badigan v. Badigan, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 481, 174 N.E.2d
718, 724, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 43 (1961), as cited in Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372,
382, 282 A.2d 351, 356 (1971).
The origin of this oft-cited passage is Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 178, 260 Pa. 765, 774 (1953), wherein
the court, faced with an argument that the abolition of charitable immunity
from tort properly belongs to the legislature, said:
However, having previously undertaken this function, and having
now considered court-decided policy is no longer valid, there seems
to be no compelling reason why we must wait for legislative action.
We closed our courtroom doors without legislative help, and we
can likewise open them. It is not necessary that courts be slow to
exercise a judicial function simply because they have been fast to
exercise a legislative one (emphasis added).
91. Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 588-89, 305 A.2d
877, 879 (1973).
92. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
93. 9 Mass. 247 (1812); see notes 33-59 and accompanying text supra.
94. Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 588-89, 305 A.2d
877, 879 (1973).
95. See notes 40-51 and accompanying text supra.
96. 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 868 (1973).
97. Id. at 570-72, 305 A.2d at 870.
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broad language, 98 subsequent decisions may limit it to school districts. Two factors may support this observation. First, the decision was not unanimous-Chief Justice Jones and Justices Eagen
and O'Brien dissented. Consequently, future decisions seeking to
apply Ayala to non-school district governmental units may encounter stiff opposition. Second, the majority opinion of Justice Roberts explicitly declares in a footnote that all prior decisions contrary to Ayala are overruled.9 9 It may be significant that all the
cases cited in that footnote, but one, l00 deal with a school district
governmental unit. Hence, it is submitted that subsequent decisions may very well limit Ayala to its facts, rather than adopt it
as apparently intended by Justice Roberts-as an abolition of immunity for all governmental units save the state. 01
IV.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

A. "The King can do no wrong."
For reasons inherent in sovereignty, the state historically has
been beyond suit. The English King, who represented the state's
sovereignty, could not be sued in his own courts unless he consented.' 0 2 For the sovereign to be amenable to suit would be in98. "We now hold that the doctrine of governmental immunity . . .
long since devoid of any valid justification . . . is abolished in this Commonwealth." Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 587, 305
A.2d 877, 878 (1973).
99. Id. at 587 n.3, 305 A.2d at 878 n.3:
Prior decisions to the contrary are overruled. See, e.g., Smeltz
v. Harrisburg, 440 Pa. 224, 269 A.2d 466 (1970); Dillon v. York
City School District, 422 Pa. 103, 220 A.2d 896 (1966); Shields v.
Pittsburgh School District, 408 Pa. 388, 184 A.2d 240 (1962); Harris
v. Mount Lebanon Township School District, 393 Pa. 633, 144 A.2d
737 (1958); Boorse v. Springfield Twp., 377 Pa. 109, 103 A.2d 708
(1954); Carlo v. Scranton School District, 319 Pa. 417, 179 A. 561
(1935); Ford v. School District, 121 Pa. 543, 15 A. 812 (1888).
100. Boorse v. Springfield Twp., 377 Pa. 109, 103 A.2d 708 (1954).
101. This conclusion is apparently supported by a subsequent introduction of a bill in the Senate of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania,
S.B. 1128, 157th Sess. (1973), which reads:
AN ACT
Making municipalities and political subdivisions liable to suits in
the same manner, courts and cases as individuals and other
entities. The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania hereby enacts
as follows:
Section 1. Suits may be brought against municipalities and
political subdivisions in the same manner, in the same courts, and
in the same cases as they are brought against individuals and other
entities.
The mere introduction of this bill indicates that Ayala is not being
read, at least by some legislators, to cover the governmental immunity of
municipalities and political subdivisions of the state.
102.

ed. 1909):

1 F.

POLLACK & F. M Ai'A,
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(2d

consistent with the idea of sovereignty. However, the English King
did sometimes consent to suit. Official wrongs were redressed in
his Court of the Exchequer with the Petition of Right as one method
of obtaining relief. 103 This view of the sovereign character of the
state appears to have been universally accepted by all the nations
in the western world. It is represented by the political thinking of
Thomas Hobbs and is also present in the political writings of the
104
French theorist, Jean Bodin.
The corollary of the idea that the English King could not be
sued save by his own consent, was the doctrine that "the King
could do no wrong." 105 As Blackstone put it, "the king, moreover,
is not only incapable of doing wrong but of thinking wrong: he
can never mean to do an improper thing ...

."106

However, the

corollary has had apparently little influence in the United States
regarding the development of sovereign immunity. The United
States Supreme Court has said the concept that the sovereign can
do no wrong has no standing in American jurisprudence. It is
wholly alien to the American doctrine expressed in constitutions
and laws, federal and state, that public officials shall not be held
He cannot be compelled to answer in his own court, but this is
true of every petty lord of every petty manor; that there happens
to be in this world no court above his [the King's] court, is we
may say, an accident.
103. Petition is al the remedy the subject hath when the king
seiseth his land or taketh away his goods from him havinge no
title by order of his lawes so to do.... And therefore is his petition called a peticion of right, because of the right the subject hath
against the king by order of his lawes to do the thing he sueth for.
Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the Crown, 38 L.Q. REV.
141, 149-50 (1922). See the discussion of Traynor, C.J., in Muscopf v.
Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 213, 359 P.2d 457, 458, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89,
91 (1961).
104. See Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L..J
757, 784-85 (1926-27).
105. But see Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1964):
Indeed it is argued by the scholars on what seems adequate evidence that the expression "the King can do no wrong" originally
meant precisely the contrary to what it later came to mean.
"[I]t meant that the king must not, was not allowed, was not
entitled to do wrong ...
Id. citing Ehrlich, Proceedings Against the Crown, 6 OXFORD STUDIES IN
SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 5 (Vinogradoff ed. 1921).
106. 1 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *246. However, Blackstone's
point was not that the king was free to do as he pleased without restraint,
but rather that, since the king could do no wrong, any wrong that was
done in his name was, in the eyes of the law, not done by the king at all.
The king can do no wrong, which antient and fundamental
maxim is not to be understood, as if everything transacted by the
government was of course just and lawful, but means two other
things. First, that whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of
public affairs is not to be imputed to the king, nor is he answerable
for it personally to his people ....

And secondly, it means that

the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any injury: it is
created for the benefit of the people and therefore cannot be extended to their prejudice.

Id.
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10 7
accountable for their actions.
Nevertheless, there exists, and has existed, in the United States
for a period long before the adoption of the United States Constitution, a strong public sentiment against the policy of permitting an
individual to sue a state without its consent.1 08 This sentiment is
reflected in the Eleventh Amendment, adopted in 1798, which
forbids an individual to use the federal judicial process to sue another state:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 10 9
1
In Beers v. Alabama, 10
Chief Justice Taney stated the policy embodied in the Eleventh Amendment when he wrote: "It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the
sovereign can not be sued in its own courts, or in any other, with-

out its consent and permission .

. .

. ""'

In the same vein, the

Minnesota Supreme Court, in deciding to hold virtually all local
governmental units liable in tort, refused to abolish the immunity of the state itself.11 2 In a footnote, the court referred to a much
earlier opinion in which it had said: "'Since the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, it has been uniformly
held that suit by an individual can not be maintained against the
state without its consent.' "113

This sentiment expressed by the Minnesota court is apparently
shared by the supreme courts of most other states, particularly prior
107. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1880).
108. Alexander Hamilton, speaking of the sovereign immunity of the
state in No. 81 of The Federalistsaid:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be answerable
to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general
sense and general practice of mankind; and this exemption, as one
of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government
of every state in the Union.
The FederalistNo. 81, at 508 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton).
109. Indeed, the eleventh amendment was a direct response to the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dallas) 419 (1792), in which the State of Georgia was held sueable
in the federal courts by a citizen of another state without the defendant
state's consent. The decision was supported by the language of the U.S.
CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1, which outlines the power of the federal judiciary.
110. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1879).
111. Id. at 529.
112. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d
795 (1965).
113. Id. at 291 n.42, 118 N.W.2d at 803 n.42, citing Berman v. Minn.
State Agricultural Soc'y, 93 Minn. 125, 127, 100 N.W. 732, 733 (1904).

to 1961.114 Nevertheless, since that time, the courts of nine states
have circumvented the "no-suit-without-consent" argument by
judicially abrogating sovereign immunity. 15 These courts have
acted primarily on the basis that the doctrine was judicially created,
and as such could be judicially abrogated. 116 Apparently the public
sentiment against an individual suing a state without its consent
has lost some of its momentum. However, most courts still continue to adhere to the old philosophy. Indeed, some courts attribute
this adherence to state constitutional provisions which have been
interpreted to shift the power to abrogate an initially common law
doctrine to the exclusive domain of the legislature. 1 7 As the next
section will indicate, Pennsylvania is an example of this type of
jurisdiction continuing to uphold sovereign immunity.
B.

Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania

Apparently, Pennsylvania falls into the cateogry of courts upholding +he doctrine nf snvereign immimity as a creature of the
state constitution. In two recent decisions dealing with the question of sovereign immunity, Brown v. Commonwealth' s and Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board,1 9 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the immunity of the commonwealth is constitutionally, not judicially, mandated. 120 Nevertheless, sovereign
immunity in Pennsylvania has also been recognized as having common law origins.
In Biello, the court traced the beginnings of sovereign immunity to Respublica v. Sparhawk."21 There a suit was brought to recover the value of flour seized by the Pennsylvania War Board pursuant to a legislative directive to prevent British capture of supplies should the latter occupy Philadelphia. In response to plaintiff's argument that "the burden of war ought to be equally borne
by all who are interested in it, and not fall disproportionately heavy
on a few," 12 2 the court held "that it is better to suffer private mischief, than a public inconvenience; and rights of necessity, form a
part of our law.' 128 The court further stated that it possessed au114. See notes 11-32 and accompanying text supra.
115. See notes 19 and 24 and accompanying text supra.
116. See notes 141-153, 167-205 and accompanying text infra.
117. See notes 167-205 and accompanying text infra.
118. 453 Pa. 566, 571, 305 A.2d 868, 870 (1973).
, 301 A.2d 849, 852 (1973).
119.
Pa.
120. Article I, Section 11 of our Constitution compels the conclusion . . . that this Commonwealth's immunity is constitutionally,

not judicially mandated. 'Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the
Legislature may by law direct.'
Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 571, 305 A.2d 868, 870 (1973) (emphasis by the court).
121. 1 Dallas 357 (Pa. 1788).
122. Id. at 362.
123. Id. Note the similarity of this statement to that of Ashurst, J.in
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thority only by statute to review proceedings properly brought before the comptroller-general.1 24 However, since the latter had no
jurisdiction in the matter, the court was of the opinion that it was
without power to grant plaintiff relief even if he were entitled
to it. 125
By conceding its lack of power, the court apparently concurred
with an earlier argument by the state's Attorney General that the
commonwealth could not be sued unless by express legislative consent. 126 Hence it is submitted that the doctrine of sovereign immunity arose in Pennsylvania from the same judicial philosophy
that may have decided governmental immunity in Russell v. The
Men of Devon' 2 7-no suit without prior legislative authorization.
Sparhawk was subsequently extended in Black v. Republicam 128 wherein Pennsylvania galley captains, fleeing the British,
seized private provisions to feed their own troops and promised
the plaintiff landowner compensation. The court denied recovery
holding that since the captains had no authority to contract, there
could be no recovery ex contractu.129 Moreover, since Sparhawk
was cited to preclude court jurisdiction in a tort suit against the
state, there could be no recovery ex delicto. 5 0
After noting the common law origins of sovereign immunity in
its Sparhawk and Black decisions, the court in Biello concluded that
it might be disposed to a consideration of the abrogation of the much
criticized doctrine. 131 However, it refused to do so on the basis
that Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution has been
"consistently . . .interpreted to mean that no suit may be maintained against the state in tort until the legislature specifically has
82
provided for such an action."'
Russell v. The Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 363 (K.B. 1788). See
notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
124. Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dallas 357, 363 (Pa. 1788).
125. Id.
126. Considering this is as a case immediately between Sparhawk and the Commonwealth, it is clear, that a sovereign is not
amenable to suit in any court unless by his own consent (1 Black.
Com. 242).
And therefore, unless the Commonwealth has expressly consented, there is nothing in the constitution of this court
which can warrant their sustaining the present proceedings.
Id. at 363.
127. See notes 41-43, 52-56 and accompanying text supra.
128. 1 Yeates 140 (Pa. 1792).
129. Id. at 142.
130. Id. at 141.
Pa.
, 301 A.2d
131. Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd.,
849, 851 (1973).
132. Id. The full text of Article I, Section 11 reads:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done

to him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have a rem-

The significant interpretation of the provision in Article I,
Section 11, appears to be the 1919 case of Collins v. Commonwealth: 33
It is clear that the Commonwealth, being sovereign, can
not be sued without her consent which may be given by
the Constitution or by statute. If the Constitution is silent
on the subject, a legislative authority, being uncontrolled,
is supreme; but if the Constitution speaks, then the legislative consent can become effective only if the legislature
has complied with the requirements imposed upon it in
passing the consenting statute; for otherwise it is authorized to consent.
Article I, Section 11, of our Constitution provides, inter
alia, that "suits may be brought against the Commonwealth
in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the
legislature may by law direct. 1 34
In Commonwealth v. Berks County,13 the next major case dealing
with this subject, the court provided that "[s]o far as Pennsylvania Courts are concerned, t is only as the lelgiaurT may by
law direct that suits may be brought against the Commonwealth:
Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, Section l1.'136
Berks County was subsequently cited with approval in 1972 by
3
Commonwealth v. Orsatti.1
1 Consequently, the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania, although initially a creature of
the common law, has received substantial support from Article I,
Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the judicial interpretations placed upon it.1 38 So much support, in fact, that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has deemed itself powerless to abolish
it.
V.

OBSTACLES

To

JUDICIAL ABROGATION

For years, the great majority of legal scholars and students of
government have generally condemned the principles of governmental and sovereign immunity, and have called for their abolition.1 39 Nevertheless, it has only been within the last twenty
edy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without fail, denial, or delay. Suits may be brought against this
Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as
the legislature may by law direct (emphasis added).
133.

262 Pa. 572, 106 A. 229 (1919).

134. Id. at 575, 106 A. at 230.
135. 364 Pa. 447, 72 A.2d 129 (1950).
136. Id. at 449, 72 A.2d at 130.
137. 448 Pa. 72, 76, 292 A.2d 313, 316 (1972).
138. See also Meagher v. Commonwealth, 439 Pa. 532, 266 A.2d 684
(1970); Bannard v. N.Y.S. Natural Gas Corp., 404 Pa. 269, 172 A.2d 306
(1961); Brewer v. Commonwealth, 345 Pa. 144, 27 A.2d 53 (1942); Bell
Telephone Co. v. Lewis, 313 Pa. 374, 169 A. 571 (1934).
139. See, e.g., Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE
L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25); Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE
L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27); Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in
Operation, 54 HAav. L. REv. 437 (1941); Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Lia-
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140
years that courts have really begun to act.

A. Legislative Policy
Although general agreement exists that immunity problems
can be most satisfactorily resolved by legislative action, 14 1 most
state legislatures have neglected to act. 42 Whether this neglect
justifies court abolition of the doctrines to force legislative action
is open to doubt. Admittedly, judicial abrogation has usually produced subsequent legislative activity. 143 Critics of this approach
bility of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1363 (1954); Smith, Municipal Tort
Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919 (1966).
140. See notes 11-32 and accompanying text supra.
141. See Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 3
(1924-25).
142. See notes 11-32 and accomnanying text supra.
143. ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-314 (Supp. 1972) (statutory supplement to Stone v. Ariz. State Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107
(1963), which abrogated sovereign immunity); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901
(Supp. 1971) (restored governmental immunity abrogated by Parish v.
Pitts, 244 Ark. 195, 427 P.2d 335 (1967) ); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6
(West. 1966) (detailed tort claims act subsequent to Muscopf v. Corning
Hosp., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961), which abrogated governmental and sovereign immunity); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
130-11-1 to 130-11-17 (Cum. Supp. 1972) (governmental immunity act
restores much immunity abrogated by Evans v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
174 Colo. 197, 482 P.2d 968 (1971) ); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.24 (1960); id.
§ 95.241 (Supp. 1972) (statutory regulation passed subsequent to the abrogation of governmental immunity by Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach,
96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) ); IDA. CODE ANN. §§ 6-901 to 6-928 (Cum.
Supp. 1973) (tort claims act following Smith v. State, 95 Idaho 795, 473
P.2d 968 (1971), which abrogated sovereign immunity); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 85, §§ 1-101 to 10-101 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (restored governmental
immunity to some extent following Moliter v. Kaneland Community Unit
Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) ); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 3.996 (107) (Supp. 1972) (restored governmental immunity for "governmental" functions following its abrogation in Williams v. City of Detroit,
374 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961) ); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 466.01-.17
(1963) (followed Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279,
118 N.W.2d 795 (1962) which abrogated governmental immunity); NEB.
REv. STAT. §§ 23-1401 to -2420 (1970) (followed Brown v. City of Omaha,
183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 795 (1968), and Johnson v. Municipal Univ. of
Omaha, 184 Neb. 512, 169 N.W.2d 286 (1969), which abrogated governmental immunity); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.031 to .039 (1969) (followed judicial
abrogation of governmental immunity in Rice v. Clark County, 79 Nev.
253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963), and Walsh v. Clark County School Dist., 82 Nev.
414, 419 P.2d 774 (1966)); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to 14-1 (Supp. 1973)
(detailed tort claims act following abrogration of governmental and sovereign immunity by Willis v. Dept. of Conservation, 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34
(1970) ); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-31-1 to 31-7 (Supp. 1972) (followed
abrogation of governmental immunity in Becker v. Beaudoin, 261 A.2d 896
(R.I. 1970) ); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 345.05 (1971), 895.43 (1966) (imposed
some limitations on abrogation of governmental immunity by Holytz v.
City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) ).

urge, however, that it involves, among other things, policy deter1 44
minations and thus an invasion of legislative prerogatives.
It must be noted that courts abrogating the immunity doctrines base their decisions almost solely on the ground that the doctrines were originally judicially created, and, as such, are subject
to judicial abolition. 145 However, this basis may be subject to
challenge on the grounds that abrogation of immunity is still a
problem for the legislature despite the initial ruling having been
made by the court." 61 Although the common law doctrines may
have been originally recognized by the judiciary, in virtually every
state the legislature has shared in its development. 147 Consequently, the enactment of isolated statutes removing immunity in
limited areas has been described as a legislative declaration of intent in the matter of governmental responsibility. Prior to the
enactment of a comprehensive tort claims act141 by its legislature,
the Iowa Supreme Court, in refusing to abrogate governmental immunity, stated:
Although the doctrine of governmental immunity may
have been of ancient judicial origin, it has been recognized as the policy of the state by the limited action of
legislature toward relaxation ....
Had the legislature favored complete abrogation of the immunity rule . . . it

could have said so and authorized the purchase of insurance4 9 ....
1

It

is significant the legislature did not do

SO.

According to this view, enactment of isolated statutes by the legislature in the tort immunity field indicates the presence of some
larger legislative policy regarding the immunity doctrines with
which the courts should not interfere.
However, the opposite view was taken by the California Supreme Court. In its decision abrogating governmental and sovereign immunity, the court reasoned that in the absence of a comprehensive statute to cover the field, it possessed the authority to
abolish immunity in those areas where the legislature had not
acted.'
Even in the District of Columbia, the federal court of
144. E.g., Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 743 (Ky. 1964)
(dissenting opinion); Weisner v. Bd. of Educ., 237 Md. 391, 392, 206 A.2d
560, 561 (1965); Rice v. Clark County, 79 Nev. 253, 259, 382 P.2d 605, 609
(1963) (dissenting opinion).
145. See notes 154-205 and accompanying text infra.
146. E.g., Clark v. Ruidoso-Hondo Valley Hosp., 72 N.M. 9, 12, 380 P.2d
168, 170 (1963).
147. See generally Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States,
supra note 13; Van Alystyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of
Change, supra note 18.
148. IowA CODE ANN. §§ 25A.1-A.20 (1967).
149. Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Ass'n, 256 Iowa 337, 346,
127 N.W.2d 606, 612 (1964).
150. Muscopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 215-16, 359 P.2d
457, 460-61, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93-94 (1961). Today a comprehensive tort
claims act is in force in California. See CALIF. GOV'T. CODE §§ 810-996.6
(West 1966).
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appeals apparently vacated an earlier deference' 51 to Congressional policy in the Federal Tort Claims Act by overruling governmental immunity on its own initiative. 152 Hence, it is submitted
that courts, determined to abolish either governmental or sovereign
immunity, will act despite existing legislative enactments narrowing the immunity. Of course, the legislature has the last word
and
153
can restore the immunity if it is considered the better policy.
B.

Constitutional or Statutory Adoption of Pre-Independence
Common Law

In several states another apparent, serious obstacle to judicial
abrogation of existing common law immunity is the presence of
either a statutory or constitutional provision which provides that
the common law shall remain in force until altered or repealed by
the legislature.'" The common law referred to is generally considered to be that body of law in force in England prior to the Declaration of Independence. 55 However, it does not include all the
common law, but only that law, general and not local to England,
which is applicable to the habits and conditions of our society, and
in harmony with the spirit and objects of our institutions.156 Furthermore, courts in the United States do not consider themselves
151. Urow v. District of Columbia, 315 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
regarding the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2671-80 (1965).
152. Spencer v. Gen. Hosp., 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
153. See, e.g., Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968), in
which the court judicially abrogated sovereign immunity. However, the
Arkansas legislature completely restored it. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901
(Supp. 1971).
But see Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111
N.W.2d 1 (1961), which abolished municipal governmental immunity in
Michigan. The immunity was subsequently restored by the legislature regarding "governmental" functions. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 3.996 (107) (Supp.
1972). However, the court declared the statute unconstitutional in Maki v.
City of East Tawas, 385 Mich. 151, 118 N.W.2d 593 (1971). So far the legislature has not reacted and apparently the court has had, at least tentatively, the "last" word.
154. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 2.01 (1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 28, § 1
(Smith-Hurd 1969); Ky. CONST. § 233; MINN. CONST., sched., § 2; Wis.
CONST. art. 14, § 13.
Such parts of the common law as are now in force in the
territory of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this constitution, shall
be and continue part of the law of this state until altered or suspended by the legislature.
WIs. CONST. art. 14, § 13.
155. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
156. E.g., Aatz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1-201 (1956):
The common law only so far as it is consistent with and adapted
to the natural physical conditions and the necessities . . . or established customs of the people is adopted....

bound by common law principles arising after 1776.117
Particularly significant is the assumption shared by many
courts that governmental immunity arose in 1788 with the English
decision of Russell v. The Men of Devon.15s If such an assumption
is correct,"1 9 a provision resting jurisdiction in the legislature to
change pre-Independence common law will not constitute a barrier
to judicial abrogation. The doctrine will be of post-Independence
vintage and not within the scope of the enactment. Hence the
court will be free to modify it. 160
Although courts may circumvent the constitutional or statutory provisions by declaring governmental immunity as having
arisen subsequent to the Declaration of Independence, other methods have been adopted to avoid this obstacle. This is especially
true where the enactment does not explicitly empower the legislature to alter the common law.1 6' The Michigan Supreme Court
has adopted an interpretive approach to avoid
the constitutional
provision. T William s 1. City of Detroit. 6-' the court, abrogating
governmental immunity, noted that the provision empowering the
legislature to alter the common law might be read as depriving
courts of all jurisdiction to alter the common law rule. 63
Another route followed by courts is merely to ignore the provision. Ironically, although all courts overruling governmental immunity appear to recognize its common law origins, some of them
do not refer to the common law provisions in their own constitutions or statutes. 64 Those courts hold that the alteration of the
immunity rule is not solely a matter for the legislature, since the
courts may change a common law rule originally judicially recog157. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
158. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788). See notes 33-51 and accompanying text supra.
159. Contra, Maffei v. Inc. Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d
808 (1959); see Notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
160. The Florida Supreme Court, in its abrogative decision of governmental immunity, made this point clear:
Assuming that the [governmental] immunity rule had its inception in The Men of Devon case, and most legal historians agree
that it did, it should be noted that this case was decided in 1788,
some twelve years after the Declaration of Independence.
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957). Consequently, the court held itself not impeded by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 2.01 (1961)
which adopted the common law in the state.
161. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-201 (1956); CALIF. CIVIL CODE
§ 22.2 (West 1954); MICH. CONST. art. 7, § 7; N.J. CONST., sched., § 1(31).
162. 354 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1962).
163. Id. at 256, 111 N.W.2d at 23, referring to MicH. CONST. sched., § 1
(1908) (same Micn. CONST. art. 7, § 7 (1963)):
The common law and statute laws now in force, not repugnant
to the constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their
own limitations or are changed, amended or repealed.
164. E.g., Moliter v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d
11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky.
1964); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795
(1962); Holytz v. City of Detroit, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
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nized when it becomes unjust, archaic, or outdated. 165 Such an
approach to constitutional or statutory provisions adopting the preDeclaration of Independence common law apparently rests on the
concept that the common law, because of its nature, has always
been, and must ever remain, responsive to the present needs of society. However, taking this view of the common law seemingly
negates constitutional and statutory provisions empowering the legislature alone to alter it.
In regard to sovereign immunity, such provisions constitute
little, if any, impediment to the abrogating court. The theory
that "the King can do no wrong" can be effectively argued as not
part of the common law intended to be adopted by a state founded
upon democratic principles." 6 However, as the next section demonstrates, courts that have abrogated, or attempted to abrogate, sovereign immunity, face a much more difficult hurdle in constitutional provisions which have been interpreted to mandate sovereign immunity.
C.

State ConstitutionalMandate of Immunity

The third, and perhaps the most difficult, obstacle to courts
considering abrogation, especially of sovereign immunity, is the
argument that the immunity is constitutionally mandated. The
source of this contention is typically the presence of a state constitutional provision which states that the "[1] egislature shall direct
by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought
against the State."'6 7 Such provisions are usually interpreted to
165. Perhaps a justification for this view may be found in a statement by the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
[W] e cannot adopt the view that the . . . Constitution [of Wisconsin] prohibits this court from now adopting common law principles or of changing them. Inherent in the common law is a dynamic principle which allows it to grow and tailor itself to meet
changing needs within the doctrine of stare decisis, which if correctly understood was not static and did not forever prevent the
courts from reversing themselves or from applying principles of
common law to new situations as the need arose. If this were not
so, we must succumb to the rule that a judge should let others
"long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he
lives, do his thinking for him."
Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 114 N.W.2d 105, 110 (1962).
This case
was cited, but not discussed, in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d
26, 35, 115 N.W.2d 618, 624 (1962), for the proposition that the court was
entitled to change the common law regardless of WIS. CONST. art. 14, § 13.
See note 154 supra for text of this provision.
166. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
167. E.g., A~iz. CONST. art. 4, § 18; CALIF. CoNsT. art. XX, § 6; DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 9; IND. CONST. art. 4, § 24; N.B. CONST. art. V, § 22; Omo
CONST. art. I, § 16; PA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WIs. CONST. art. IV, § 27.

mean that the "state may not be sued without consent by the legislature."' 16 Hence the judicial machinery is deemed impotent in
handling the immunity problem. A petition for legislative action
is considered the only remedy.1 9
As previously discussed, 170 Russell v. The Men of Devon,1 7'
generally cited as the common law origin of governmental immunity, may have been misinterpreted by the courts and may merely
stand for the proposition that suits against the county were not to
be permitted in the absence of prior statutory authority. Apparently, Russell has been adopted in this country for precisely that
proposition in Mower v. Leicester.172 Similarly, the rise of sovereign immunity, although originating with the king himself, and
hence of different origin than its governmental counterpart, arrived in the United States supported by the same judicial reasoning-no suit without legislative consent. 17 3 Consequently, it is
submitted that court interpretations of constitutional provisions enabling the legislature to specify the manner and the courts in which
suits may be brought against the state, are reiterations of ancient
common law thinking.
This premise, however, would not survive the Supreme Courts
of California, Indiana, and a lower court in Ohio. Those courts
have interpreted their respective state constitutional provisions,
not as reiterating the common law immunity, but as possibly waiving it.
Early in 1961, by a pair of companion decisions, the California
Supreme Court cast both the doctrines of governmental and sovereign immunity into discard as mistaken and unjust. In the principal case, Muscopf v. Corning Hospital District,174 the court, recog-

nizing the doctrines of immunity as originally court-made, 17 5 swept
away all vestiges of immunity in words which made it clear that
no level of government in the state could rely upon the "governmental" nature of its function as a defense to tort liability. 76 In
so doing, the court circumvented an argument based upon Article
168. E.g., Shellhorn & Hill, Inc. v. State, 55 Del. 298, 187 A.2d 71
(1962); Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972).
169. See note 199 and accompanying text infra.
170. See notes 40-56 and accompanying text supra.
171. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
172. 9 Mass. 247 (1812). See notes 52-56 and accompanying text supra.
173. See notes 102-117 and accompanying text supra.
174. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
175. Id. at 217, 359 P.2d at 461, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
176. Id. at 213, 359 P.2d at 458, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 90. The companion
decision, Lipman v. Brisbane Elem. School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d
465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961), however, softened the impact of the new rule
somewhat by refusing to sustain liability in tort of a public entity whose
culpable employee was immune from personal liability because of the discretionary nature of his duties. Official immunity, the court pointed out,
was based upon a policy of preventing the threat of tort litigation, with
potential liability, from serving as a deterrent to vigorous and forthright
fulfillment of public duty. Id. at 229, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
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XX, Section 6 of the California Constitution which provides: "Suits
may be brought against the State in such manner and in such
courts as shall be directed by law." It was urged upon the court
that this provision be interpreted as having substantive significance
and thus establishing a rule of sovereign immunity. 177 The court
rejected the argument saying:
If the section has any substantive significance it would
appear to be a waiver of immunity. On its face it seems
to say that the state may be held liable when suits are
brought against it in accordance with a legislatively prescribed procedure. Consistent with our previous construction of essentially identical statutory language, however,
we hold that Article XX, Section
6 provides merely for a
8
legislative consent to suit."7

In essence, the court rejected the constitutional provision as establishing substantive sovereign immunity. Rather, the provision was
viewed merely as an enabling provision whereby the legislature
could consent to suit.
Moreover, the court was not of the opinion that the provision,
by authorizing legislative consent to suit, vested exclusive jurisdiction regarding immunity abrogation in the legislature. Indeed, the
court felt free to adhere to its own rules of immunity in areas
179
where the legislature had not acted.
In this latter aspect, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has held otherwise. In 1962, the court abrogated sovereign and
governmental immunity in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee. 8 0 Satisfied that the immunity doctrines were of judicial origin and noting
the failure of the legislature to adopt corrective measures, 181 the
court removed the defense of nonliability but retained the right of
the state to be sued only upon its consent.18 2 Consequently, the
Wisconsin court, like that of California, refused to consider the
constitutional provision as giving rise to substantive immunity.
Unlike its counterpart in California, however, it deemed itself precluded from entertaining suits against the state in the absence of
legislative consent. It is submitted that the Wisconsin court, in
effect, only nominally abrogated the immunity while retaining it
under a procedural shield to liability. 183
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 216, 359 P.2d at 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
Id. at 217, 359 P.2d at 460-61, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 92-93.
Id. at 218, 359 P.2d at 461, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
Id. at 33, 115 N.W.2d at 623.
Id. at 38-39, 115 N.W.2d at 625-26 (emphasis by court).
However, the decision in Holytz did create interpretive ambigui-

ties for the Wisconsin courts regarding the existing statutory authorizations

In 1969, the Indiana Supreme Court, in its unanimous decision,
Perkins v. State,8 4 concluded that the State of Indiana was not immune from liability in the exercise of proprietary functions. In
reaching its decision, the court was presented with an argument
that suits could not be brought against the state unless permitted
by statute. 18 5 That contention was based upon Article 4, Section
24 of the Indiana Constitution.' 8 8
The court interpreted this provision as not containing a plain,
unequivocal statement that the State of Indiana shall be immune
from suits imposing liability for damages, but only giving rise to an
inference of such.' 8 7 Furthermore, the court stated:
As we read this section it occurs to us that the framers of
the rlndiana] Constitution assumed that at common law
the State was immune from suit and authorized the legislature to modify such liability to the extent it may see fit,
providing that no private acts or special acts were passed
for the benefit of some individual. We are not dealing
here with a constitutional prohibition, but rather with a
principle of common law of England which held "the King
can do no wrong" and hence could not be sued in any
court of law.'8 8
By viewing the immunity as a principle of common law, and not
as a constitutional mandate, the court expressed no hesitancy in
assuming jurisdiction in the decision.'8 9 Consequently, the Indiana Supreme Court, like that of California, refused to recognize
that a constitutional provision either mandated substantive sovereign immunity, or invested the legislature with the solitary power
to abrogate the doctrine. In 1972, the court extended the philsophy of Perkins to "governmental" functions of the state, and
of liability. These prior laws were suddenly transformed into apparent
limitations upon the common law liability, due to the elimination by
Holytz of the basic premise of governmental and sovereign immunity
upon which the previous statutory structure had been erected. Consequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court retreated from earlier and stricter
view of such statutes as to their meaning and application. Van Alystyne,
Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919,
946 (1966).
184. 252 Ind. 549, 251 N.E.2d 30 (1969).
185. Id. at 552, 251 N.E.2d at 31-32.
186. Article 4, Section 24 of the Indiana Constitution states:
Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit against
the State as to all liabilities originating after the adoption of this
Constitution; but no special act authorizing such suit to be
brought, or making compensation to any person claiming damages
against the State shall ever be passed.
187. Perkins v. State, 252 Ind. 549, 552, 251 N.E.2d 30, 31-32 (1969).
188. Id. at 552-53, 251 N.E.2d at 32.
189. The argument that the legislature-not the Court-is the one
to make the change, is answered by the fact that the principle was
created by the courts as part of the common law, and if error exists or if the principle has become antiquated, it is the duty of
the Court to change it.
Id. at 555, 251 N.E.2d at 34 analogizing to prior abrogating decisions of
charitable immunity: Harris v. Y.W.C.A., 250 Ind. 491, 237 N.E.2d 242
(1968); Ball Mem. Hosp. v. Freeman, 247 Ind. 71, 196 N.E.2d 274 (1964).
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hence imposed total tort responsibility upon the state regardless of
the nature of the offending activity.190
In 1971 it appeared the philosophy of the California and
Indiana courts had gained a foothold in Ohio. The Ohio Court
of Appeals, in Krause v. State,19 1 rule the State of Ohio responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior for tortious acts of
its authorized agents. The state argued that it did not consent
to be sued for the alleged negligence of its agents and employees
and therefore the doctrine of sovereign immunity insulated it and
its agents from response to the law. 192 Article I, Section 16 of the
Ohio Constitution, cited as support for this argument, provides,
inter alia: "Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts
and in such manner, as may be provided by law."
Nevertheless, after considering the history of the constitutional
language, the court followed the reasoning in Muscopf v. Corning
Hospital District193 and reversed fifty-three years of prior holdings
that the provision was not self-executing and thus required legislative authority by statute as a prerequisite to suit. 9 4 Quoting
liberally with approval from Muscopf, the court considered the
rule of sovereign immunity to be originally court-made. 19 5 Moreover, it followed the interpretation of the California court that the
constitutional provision did not preclude judicial abrogation of the
immunity. The enactment was viewed as authorizing the legislature to waive the immunity in areas that body may select, while
permitting the courts to adhere to its own rules of immunity in
19 6
other areas.
Notwithstanding, less than a year later, the Ohio Supreme
Court reversed this interpretation by the appellate court. 197 The
court agreed with the appellate court that sovereign immunity
was originally judicially created. 91g However, it concluded that
it was not subject to judicial reexamination, citing the need for
constitutional amendment to modify the present constitutional protection afforded the state.199 In effect, the Ohio Supreme Court
190. Campbell v. State, Ind. , 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972).
191. 28 Ohio App. 2d 1, 274 N.E.2d 321 (1971).
192. Id. at 3, 274 N.E.2d at 322-23.
193. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961). See notes
174-79 and accompanying text supra.
194. Krause v. State, 28 Ohio App. 2d 1, 4, 274 N.E.2d 321, 323 (1971).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 142-43, 285 N.E.2d 733, 743-45
(1969).
198. Id. at 143, 285 N.E.2d at 745.
199. Id.

assumes a posture similar to that taken by its counterpart in Wisconsin 20 0-- a nominal interment of the sovereign immunity doctrine by its reclassification under a procedural concept.
In 1973, reasons of fairness, necessity and the encouragement of
greater governmental responsibility motivated the Louisiana Supreme Court to adopt a stance opposite that of the Ohio court.
In Board of Commissioners v. Splendour Shipping & Enterprises,
Inc.,20 1 all boards and agencies of the State of Louisiana were held
liable in tort. This conclusion was reached in spite of an argument
that the court was forbidden to waive the immunity of the state, or
of its agencies, by Article 3, Section 35 of the Louisiana Constitution, which was amended in 1960 to allow the legislature to waive
202
immunity either totally or for specific governmental entities.
Apparently, the court viewed the provision as neither creating
a substantive doctrine of sovereign immunity, nor as precluding
court discretion in abrogating the concept. Indeed, the court found
that "[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity in Louisiana did not
20 3
have its origin in

. .

. State Constitutions, but in jurisprudence.

Moreover, the significance of the constitutional provision was interpreted as a
. . . [c] lear indication of the legislative policy [to require
boards and agencies of the state to act responsibly or be
subject to suit]. If any legislative authorization has been
given for suit against any public body, it constitutes an
effective waiver of immunity and liability. It is now and
has been since 1864 the policy of this State that "every
person for injury done him.., shall have adequate remedy
by due process of law and justice administered
without
' 20 4
denial, partialityor unreasonabledelay.

This view of the Louisiana Supreme Court regarding Article 3,
Section 35 of the Louisiana Constitution represents an extreme
position among courts faced with similar provisions. Not only is
the enactment viewed as a failing to hinder judicial abrogation;
it is regarded as an effective legislative ally to courts in providing
200. See notes 180-183 and accompanying text supra.
201.
La.
, 273 So. 2d 19 (1973).
202. As amended in 1960, Article 3, Section 35 of the Louisiana Constitution provides:
The Legislature is empowered to waive, by special or general laws
or resolution, the immunity from suit or from liability of the state.
and of parishes, municipalities, political subdivisions, public boards,
institutions, departments, commissions, districts, corporations, agencies, and authorities of other public or governmental bodies; and
each authorization by the Legislature for suits against the State or
other such public body, heretofore and hereafter enacted or granted
shall be construed to be and shall be effective and valid for all
purposes, as of and from the date thereof as a waiver of the defendant's immunity both from suit and from liability.
203. Board of Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping & Enterprises, Inc.,
La.
, 273 So. 2d 19, 23 (1973).
204. Id. at
, 273 So. 2d at 26 (emphasis added), citing LA. CoNsT.
art. I, § 6; art. 110 (1864); art. 10 (1868); art. 11 (1879); art. 6 (1898); art.
6 (1913).
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redress for injuries heretofore blocked by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
In summary, the obstacle presented to judicial abrogation of
sovereign immunity by constitutional provisions, which authorize
the manner and courts in which the state may be sued, is indeed
formidable. Nevertheless, the California, Indiana, and Louisiana
experiences indicate that it is surmountable. The courts of those
states recognize that the sovereign immunity concept is one of judicial origin, and remains subject to court alterations regardless of
subsequent constitutional enactments. The ultimate effect of
these provisions is not to vest exclusive jurisdiction over the immunity in the legislature; but to authorize that body to abrogate
the concept in areas it deems best, and permit the courts to adhere
20 5
to its own rules of immunity in other areas.
205. This discussion has dealt exclusively with direct attempts to
meet the "no-suit-without-consent" argument. It should be noted, however, that courts, unwilling or unable, to meet the issue head-on, may resort to an indirect approach by implying consent from the presence of liability insurance.
Heretofore, this approach has not been very successful. Especially in
the absence of statutory authority to do so, it has been commonly held
that the purchase of liability insurance by governmental units is ultra
vires and hence has no effect on the immunity from tort of such unit.
E.g., Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Wainscott, 41 Ariz. 439, 19 P.2d 328
(1933); Burns v. American Casualty Co., 127 Cal. App. 2d 198, 273 P.2d
605 (1954); Adkins v. West. & So. Indem. Co., 117 W. Va. 451, 186 S.E. 302
(1936). Even if the purchase is authorized, the large majority of decisions
has held that mere authorization is not a waiver of tort immunity. E.g.,
Hammer v. School Dist., 124 Ind. App. 30, 112 N.E.2d 891 (1953); Maffei v.
Incorp. Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959).
However, in line with the current trend toward increased governmental
responsibility, more recent decisions have held that the authorized purchase of insurance carries with it a waiver of immunity to the extent of
insurance coverage. The following is a list of jurisdictions which have
adopted this position regarding governmental immunity: Davis v. City of
Macon, 122 Ga. App. 665, 178 S.E.2d 557 (1970); Parker v. City of Hutchinson, 196 Kan. 148, 410 P.2d 347 (1966); Bale v. Ryder,
Me.
, 286
A.2d 344 (1972); Durr v. Alfred Jacobshagen Co., 243 Miss. 730, 139 So. 2d
852 (1962); Tucker v. City of Okolona,
Miss.
, 227 So. 2d 475 (1969);
Fette v. City of St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1963); Gossler v. City of
Manchester, 107 N.H. 310, 221 A.2d 242 (1966); Clark v. Ruidoso-Hondo
Valley Hosp. Dist., 72 N.M. 9, 380 P.2d 168 (1963); Steelman v. City of New
Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 184 S.E.2d 239 (1971); Shermoen v. Lindsay, 163 N.W.2d
738 (N.D. 1968); Ballew v. City of Chattanooga, 205 Tenn. 289, 326 S.W.2d
466 (1959).
Similar results regarding sovereign immunity obtained in the following states: Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 157 Me. 174, 170 A.2d 687
(1961); Shermoen v. Lindsay, 163 N.W.2d 738 (N.D. 1968); State v. Peter
Salvucci & Sons, Inc., 281 A.2d 164 (N.H. 1971); Clark v. Ruidoso-Hondo
Valley Hosp., 7 N.M. 9, 380 P.2d 168 (1963); Newman v. State ex rel.
Bd. of Regents, 490 P.2d 1079 (Okla. 1971).
Pennsylvania, prior to the abrogation of governmental immunity by

D.

Obstaclesto JudicialAbrogation in Pennsylvania

Obstacles to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its attempts
to abrogate the immunity doctrines fall into two categories: 20 6 the
argument to defer to general legislative policy, 20 7 and the argu20 8
ment that immunity is constitutionally mandated.
The first obstacle was easily overcome by the court in its abrogative decision of governmental immunity in Ayala v. Philadel209
phia Board of Public Education.
In its brief, counsel for the
Board of Education argued that the legislature was the proper
forum for any changes because of its ability to create a comprehensive solution.21 0 Not impressed with this argument, the court
countered with its earlier rationale in limiting charitable 21 1 and
intra-family 212 immunities: "We closed our courtroom doors without legislative help, and we can likewise open them. ' 218 Although the court acknowledged its prior suggestions to the legislature to undertake the abrogation of governmental immunity,
it nonetheless felt that, "these suggestions- do not preclude
niir
214
Court from now abolishing this judicially created doctrine.

However, the facility with which the court "opened" and
Ayala, still clung to the view that the presence of insurance did not waive
the immunity. E.g., Michael v. School Dist., 391 Pa. 209, 137 A.2d 456
(1958).
Similarly, with regard to the still-upheld doctrine of sovereign
immunity, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will not imply consent from
available insurance coverage. See Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566,
570, 305 A.2d 868, 870 (1973).
Hence it may be a reasonable conclusion
that the only method to judicially circumvent sovereign immunity is by
the more direct attack of abrogation. See notes 230-236 and accompanying text infra.
206. Apparently the court would not be concerned whether either immunity doctrine arose subsequent or prior to 1776. See notes 154-166 and
accompanying text supra. Although PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 46, § 151 (1969)
did revive provincial laws and adopt English common laws and statutes,
it was repealed by the Act of Dec. 6, 1972, Pub. L. No. 290, § 4, which was
immediately effective.
207. See notes 141-153 and accompanying text supra.
208. See notes 167-205 and accompanying text supra.
209. 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
210. Brief for Appellee at 2, Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453
Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973):
The rationale for retention of the doctrine of immunity has
been marked in recent years by a realization that the legislature is
the proper body to make such a significant change as abolition.
The legislature can more effectively deal with the administrative
details of change because of its superior ability to create a comprehensive and flexible solution.
Although few courts have taken the broad step of abolishing
immunity, a greater number upon reexamination have concluded
that the doctrine should be retained, or change undertaken by the
legislature.
211. Flagiello v. Pa. Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965).
212. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
213. Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 600, 305 A.2d 877,
885 (1973).
214. Id. at 602, 305 A.2d at 886, referring to Morris v. Mt. Lebanon
School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 634, 144 A.2d 737, 738 (1958) and Dillon v. York
City School Dist., 422 Pa. 103, 107, 220 A.2d 896, 898 (1966).
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"closed" the door to governmental immunity is not present when
The impediconsidering the abrogation of sovereign immunity.
ment is Article 1, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which
has been interpreted to mandate sovereign immunity and vest exclusive jurisdiction in the legislature to alter the concept. As a
result, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has deemed itself impotent to consider abrogation." '
Nevertheless, three factors seem to militate against a conclusion
that this attitude of the court will long endure. The first is that
in its two most recent decisions upholding the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, the court has been by no means unanimous. Biello v.
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board 16 was decided over the
strong dissenting opinion of Justice Nix in which Justice Roberts
joined. Subsequently, Brown v. Commonwealth 217 was decided
over three dissenting opinions of Justices Roberts, Nix, and
Manderino. Consequently, strong abrogative opinions will be raised
to continually test the vitality of the sovereign immunity doctrine
in future cases dealing with the issue.
The second factor which casts doubt on the future of sovereign
immunity in Pennsylvania is the attitude taken by the majority
in Biello and Brown. Apparently empathizing with the plaintiff
but expressing helplessness in the situation, the court acknowledged
that if the issue were one of first impression, they would not have
established immunity. 218 Accordingly, the court pleaded for legislative action: "We reiterate our urging of the need for comprehensive action permissible under Article I, Section 11.''219 The
court recognized that previous pleadings for legislative activity
have been futile.
In the past, appeals to our Legislature to follow [the legislative solutions adopted by other states] has invariably
fallen upon deaf ears .... We can
only hope they will
220
now see the wisdom of such action.
It is apparent that the recent majority opinions sustaining sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania stand on reluctant grounds.
215. See notes 132-138 and accompanying text supra.
216.
Pa. , 301 A.2d 849 (1973).
217. 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 868 (1973).
218. Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd.,
Pa. , 301 A.2d
849, 852 (1973).
219. Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 571 n.6, 305 A.2d 868, 870
n.6 (1973), citing Stouffer v.Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 502-03, 162 A.2d 378,
381 (1960).
220. Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd.,
Pa. , 301 A.2d
849, 852-53 n.3 (1973).

The third, and perhaps most decisive, factor in doubting the
continued longevity of sovereign immunity in the commonwealth,
is the application of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction to
sovereign immunity cases. 221 Considering the reluctance of the
court to continue the doctrine together with the ready framework
established in other states, 222 it is submitted that, notwithstanding
the interpretation of Article I, Section l1-no suit without legislative consent 223-should the offending state activity be deemed
"proprietary," liability will follow regardless of legislative authorization.2 24 Moreover, the adoption of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction may subject sovereign immunity to the same
inconsistent, piecemeal erosion that plagued governmental immu225
nity prior to its abrogation.
The foregoing three factors-a strong minority, a reluctant
majority admonishing the legislature to action, and an explicit adoption of a distinction heretofore limited to governmental immunity-indicate that the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania stands on rather uncertain grounds. Should the legislature
fail to heed the suggestions by the court to fashion comprehensive
tort legislation, 26 it is submitted that the Pennsylvania Supreme
221.

In Biello, the court stated:
While in Pennsylvania we have not before expressly employed
the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions
when considering the sovereign immunity doctrine, it has nonetheless been implicit in our application of the doctrine. In many
of our decisions, where we have found the bar to exist, we have
noted that the function being performed was a governmental one.
In accepting the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions, we are appreciative of the difficulties experienced
by our courts in using this distinction in the context of governmental immunity cases....
Id. at
, 301 A.2d at 851-52. But see Pomeroy, J., concurring in Brown
wherein it is stated that Article I, Section 11 applies regardless whether the
function is characterized as "governmental" or "proprietary;" and that the
"governmental" functions interpreted in Biello were not meant to be used
in contradistinction to the idea of "proprietary." Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 574 n.1, 305 A.2d 868, 873 n.1 (1973).
222. See notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra.
223. See notes 131-138 and accomuanying text supra.
224. See Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 577, 305 A.2d 868, 873
(1973) (Roberts, J., dissenting opinion).
225. See notes 80-85 and accompanying text supra.
226. As of the writing of this Comment, legislative responses have
been somewhat less than comprehensive:
H.B. 1183, 157th Sess. (1973):
AN Act
Authorizing, pursuant to the authority granted the Legislature by
Section 11, Article I of the Constitution of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, suit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a party defendant and permitting the joinder of the
Commonwealth as a party defendant in certain cases.
S.B. 1125, 157th Sess. (1973):
An Act
Making the Commonwealth liable to suits in the same manner,
courts and cases as individuals and other entities.
S.B. 1126, 157th Sess. (1973):
A Joint Resolution
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Commonwealth
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Court may be receptive to arguments advocating the judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity.
Apparently, an argument, which may be adopted by the court
in any future opinion abolishing sovereign immunity, may be one
adopting the reasoning in Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public
Education 2 7-the doctrine was court-originated and can be courtabrogated. Although Ayala dealt with governmental immunity,
its extension to the issue of sovereign immunity may be logical.
As already discussed, 228 governmental and sovereign immunities
may have had separate origins, but both concepts may be supported by a similar judicial philosophy-no suit without prior legislative consent. 22 9 However, before Ayala can be adopted to sovereign immunity, there remains the problem of Article I, Section 11
of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
As the Supreme Courts of California, Indiana, and Louisiana
have done, 2 0 the Pennsylvania court must first hurdle the argument that Article I, Section 11 constitutionally mandates sovereign
immunity. It should be emphasized that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity as based upon Article I, Section 11 arose from court
interpretationof that enactment and not from the explicit wording
of the provision. 231 Indeed, on examining Article I, Section 11 in
of Pennsylvania, Article I, Section 11 removing the sovereign
immunity of the Commonwealth to suit and making it liable
in the same manner, courts, and cases as are individuals and
other entities.
S.B. 1128, 157th Sess. (1973). See note 101 supra for full text.
227. 453 Pa. 877, 305 A.2d 877 (1973). See notes 209-214 and accompanying text supra.
228. See generally notes 33-39 and accompanying text supra.
229. See notes 40-43, 52-59, 102-117 and accompanying text supra.
230. See notes 174-179, 184-190 and 200-203 and accompanying text
supra.
231. See notes 131-138 and accompanying text supra. In the dissenting words of Justice Manderino in Brown:
[The doctrine of sovereign immunity] is a doctrine which has no
support in the written constitution of Pennsylvania-and never
had.
The majority concludes that past decisions of this Court have
settled the question. They have not. Each of the past decisions of
this Court have pronounced the existence of sovereign immunity
and then cited a previous case in support of the pronouncement.
One would expect that a search through the precedents, containing
the pronouncement followed by a prior citation, would eventually lead to the origin of the judicial chain and a discovery that
the chain is solidly anchored in principles worthy of government
established by a written constitution. Such a discovery cannot be
found in prior decisions of this Court. Those decisions have assumed that the sovereign is the state and that the state possesses
inherent and inalienable rights-the exact principles of government
guillotined and buried in the human revolutions that gave birth
to written constitutions.

its entirety, it may be unreasonable to conclude that a mandate of
232
sovereign immunity lies within its provisions.
Justice Nix refutes the contention that sovereign immunity is
mandated by Article I, Section 11. In his dissent in Biello, he interprets the provision as merely setting forth:
. . IT]he
[
mechanism by which the State may waive [its
power to consent to suit] .

. .

. The Constitution is there-

fore neutral-it neither requires nor prohibits sovereign
immunity. The framers of the Constitution accepted the
then prevalent concept of sovereignty to include immunity
from suit, and attempted through this section to implement
the
power of the State to consent to actions brought against
it.2 3
Thus far, the foregoing arguments have suggested that Article
1, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not mandate
sovereign immunity. Rather, it merely provides a procedural device whereby the legislature may implement substantive constitutional rights and consent to suits brought against the state. What
remains to be considered is whether Article I, Section 11, although
neutral as to immunity, vests exclusive jurisdiction in the legislature to abolish the principle. The Supreme Courts of Wisconsin
and Ohio have held in the affirmative; 21 4 those of California, Indiana, and Louisiana have answered otherwise.2 3 5 Perhaps, Justice
Nix, dissenting in Biello, may provide the key to a possible Pennsylvania response:
[Article I, Section 11] of the Constitution was also directed to resolving the issue of whether there was, in fact,
the power to consent to suit and if the power was found to
exist, which branch of the government had the power to
exercise that judgment. The majority mistakenly concludes that since the framers recognized the need for resolution of these issues, they thereby mandated the doctrine
itself. In my judgment it is an unwarranted conclusion
to assume from the grant of power of consent to the legislative branch that this was implicitly an abrogation of
the court's traditional powers to abolish common2 38law
principles when they no longer meet the needs of time.
According to this view, Pennsylvania would consequently fall in
line behind California, Indiana, and Ohio.
Hence it is submitted that valid arguments can be made on beBrown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 580, 305 A.2d 868, 875 (1973) (emphasis by the court).
232. Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 580, 305 A.2d 868, 875 (1973)
(Manderino, J., dissent).
233. Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd.,
Pa. , 301 A.2d 849,
854 (1973). Accord, Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 577, 305 A.2d
868, 871 (1973) (Roberts, J., dissent).
234. See notes 182-83, 198-99 and accompanying text supra.
235. See notes 179, 189, 203 and accompanying text supra.
236. Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd.,
Pa. , 301 A.2d
849, 854 (1973).
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half of judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania.
It is further submitted that should the General Assembly of Pennsylvania fail to heed the recent pleas in Biello and Brown for comprehensive tort legislation, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may
abandon its present stance regarding sovereign immunity. In so
doing, the court may very well adopt an argument similar to the
foregoing to bury the immunity theory next to its still-warm governmental counterpart.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In view of the modern belief that society, not the individual
should bear the burden of costs occasioned by the torts of the state
and local governmental units, the rules of governmental and sovereign immunity are unjust and archaic. Although the courts may
not invalidate a statute merely because it violates their sense of
justice, they can admittedly modify a common law rule when it
becomes unjust. State legislatures, which alone can effectively
solve the problem of governmental responsibility, have neglected
their obligation to act. However, they have been forced to face the
problem by courts abrogating the immunity doctrines. In this
respect the principal contribution of the judicial abrogation movement is its influence on legislative consideration of the problem.
Such consideration is necessary-legislative help is needed to fix
the responsibility of various governmental units with due regard
for the position they occupy within the total governmental structure.
Via Ayala, Pennsylvania has experienced this trend toward
collective responsibility for damages arising in the exercise of public
activities. The ultimate effect of its judicial abrogation of governmental immunity in promoting legislative action is yet to be seen.
However, should the General Assembly continue to ignore the judicial pleas for comprehensive tort legislation, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court may provide stronger incentive by abolishing the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
HENRY T. ZALE

